

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA		X		
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	C/ACIS		X		
20	NIO/SP		X		
21	NIO/USSR-EE		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

4 April 1984

Date

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Executive Registry

84 - 1572

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Geneva, Switzerland

April 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Mr. Robert McFarlane
FROM: E. Rowny (R)
SUBJECT: Major Outstanding Issues in START

At the SACPG last Friday, we discussed a tutorial for the President's reading on major outstanding issues in START and my assessment of what our bottom line should be.

Attached are both of those papers for your information and for the President.

Attachments:
As stated.

Info: Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
General Vessey
Mr. Casey
Ambassador Adelman

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C-134

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Major Outstanding Issues in START

- At this stage in the talks, two major issues divide US and USSR:
(1) Reductions and (2) Aggregation.

Reductions

- Warheads: Soviets have made it clear they cannot accept 5000. US can live with reductions to range of 6000-7000 in the context of throw-weight reduction. However, we must have some reductions from current levels (Soviets are at 8000, the US at 7400).
- Throw-weight: Reductions in throw-weight should be linked to reductions in warheads. If the warhead ceiling rises above 7000, it should be accompanied by a direct throw-weight ceiling. US can live with Soviet throw-weight levels in range of 3.0-3.5 MKg (48%-40% reduction from current level).
- SNDVs: Current US proposal would result in an implicit SNDV limit of 1650. We have not given Soviets a revised level for deployed missiles. However, we can go higher than current guidance of 1250, to allow for greater number of Midgetmen and enhanced stability. US has proposed 400 heavy bombers, but we can live with 350.

Aggregation

- To reinforce our emphasis on reductions in more destabilizing systems, the US has proposed separate limits on: 1) ballistic missiles, 2) ballistic missile warheads, 3) heavy bombers, and 4) ALCMs.
- Soviets have proposed a combined aggregate limit on "nuclear charges," that includes not only ballistic missile warheads, but bomber weapons (ALCMs, SRAMs and gravity bombs). Such aggregation would allow Soviets a large advantage in ballistic missile warheads. It ignores the US need for advantage in bomber weapons to penetrate massive Soviet air defenses.
- US can live with SNDV aggregate at 1800 level. Would allow greater force structuring flexibility and by accepting the 1800 level, we would go half-way toward Soviet position.
- US must firmly reject aggregation of missile RVs and bomber weapons as proposed by the Soviets.

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-2-

Other Issues

Stability

- US insists that an agreement must enhance the stability of the strategic balance by reducing first strike threat.
- US seeks to focus reductions on more destabilizing MIRVed ballistic missiles and to encourage less destabilizing systems, such as single RV ICBMs.
- Soviets do not agree that current asymmetry in ICBM capability is destabilizing.
- Soviets claim that all strategic weapons are equal in their impact on stability.
- Soviets agree with us that vulnerability of fixed ICBMs will be a problem. Soviet answer is to deploy mobile ICBMs.

Equality

- US seeks overall equality in strategic capabilities but does not seek equality in every measure of strategic capability. Overall equality could be implemented through offsetting asymmetries in areas of US and Soviet advantage.
- Soviets seek to base agreement on principle of equality and equal security. As Soviets interpret it, this means Soviet equality with all other nuclear powers combined.

INF Interrelationship

- US prefers to continue separate but parallel INF and START talks. Merger not in US interest.
- Soviets also oppose START/INF merger.
- Soviets claim that US "forward based systems" are strategic because they can strike the USSR, and that corresponding Soviet systems, such as the SS-20, are not strategic because they cannot strike the US.
- From outset of START, Soviets conditioned proposed reductions to 1800 to no deployment of US P-II and GLCM.
- When START Round V ended (December 8), Soviets said that US INF deployments had changed the strategic situation and required them to reassess their START position before providing a START resumption date.

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-3-

Verification

- US insists on effective verification. The Soviets cannot be allowed verification advantages by virtue of their closed society.
- US will insist on necessary cooperative measures to supplement NTM, including on-site inspection where required.
- US insists on complete ban on all encryption of telemetry during ballistic missile flight tests.
- Soviets say that NTM must remain the principle verification tool.
- Soviets say they will consider cooperative measures to supplement NTM but, in general, have a more limited view of cooperative measures than we do.
- Soviets claim that on-site inspection would complicate achieving an agreement.

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- Provide for deterrence;
- Enhance stability in times of crisis;
- Eliminate threat and benefit from any use of nuclear weapons, especially a first strike;
- Deterrence to be assured through substantial reductions in overall levels of destructive capability and potential;
- Stability to be enhanced through a decrease in ICBM warhead to missile ratio from its current approximate 4 to 1 level;
- Permit modernization in stabilizing systems;
- Encourage linkage in strategic offensive-strategic defensive forces;
- Specific objectives:
 - Reductions in ballistic missiles, their warheads and throw-weight to roughly 1250-1800 SNDVs, 5000-7000 warheads, and 3 to 3.5 MKg throw-weight.
 - Trade-offs in advantages to permit reductions of US bombers and cruise missiles for favorable reductions of Soviet ballistic missile programs.
 - Permit force structure flexibility within a reduction plan which avoids weapons aggregation and freedom-to-mix, provided substantial reduction in Soviet ballistic missile destructive capability and potential occurs.
 - Verification beyond NTM (forms of cooperative measures, bans on telemetry encryption) which do not rule out on-site inspection.

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